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Abstract
In the last decades the interaction between Labour Standards and
International Trade has assumed new importance.
We use an incentive based-approach to assess the e¢ ciency of trade
policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of international
labour standards in Southern Firms. We show that trade policy instru-
ments may implement minimum standards. On the other hand, we nd
that private schemes may overcome minimum standards if and only if
there is an exclusive contract between the MNE and the Southern rm,
due to free-riding e¤ect.
Keywords: international trade, labour standards, product di¤erentia-
tion, corporate social responsibility.
1 Introduction
The interaction between labor standards1 and International trade has assumed
new importance in the last decades.2
During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, United States
and France tried to insert in the GATT agenda the labor standards. It is argued
that lower labor standards in a country give an advantage to the rm on the
international market, because the price of the good does not reect entirely the
Phd Student, Paris School of Economics
1Labor standards are dened as minimal rules for workplace conditions and outcomes
imposed by legal mandate.
2 In the last years the volume of strikes and demonstrations in the shoe and clothes factories
throughout Asia has notably increased. Nike and Reebok, the most important athletic shoe
manufacturer, has been accused by human rights groups of running overseas sweatshops.
Clothing makers also have come under re for conditions at factories elsewhere in Asia. Reebok
was obliged to publish on the web the list of its subcontractors; nike faced a strike in the
vietnamese plant of its taiwanese sub contractor accused of non respecting the vietnamese
minimum wage.
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social cost of production. This is considered an unfairsource of comparative
advantage3 .
The argument related to the harmonization of labor standards to solve the
unfaircompetition presumes that labor standards (LS) are dened as absolute
and universal. However, if we accept the idea that LS are matter of the domestic
country, it means that national level of LS may depend on countrys stage of
development and per capita income. This means that LS would at the end
reect domestic collective preferences.4
Indeed, the issue related to the international labor standards has an economic
and moral component.
The economic argument concerns the concept of social dumping.5 This is
a practice performed not just by rms but also by the government to create a
competitive cost advantage for their own industries or to attract Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs). Labor unions and human rights activists in the North,
argue that these practices cause several problems to workers of the North since
a lot of rms delocalise in developing countries.
The moral argument refers mainly to the fact that low wages and labor
standards violate human rights of workers in developing contries.
Policy makers and labor unions in Europe and in the United States propose
as a solution what are dened social clauses. They refer to tari¤s on import
goods from countries that dont respect minimal working conditions.They con-
sider these tari¤s a tool to prevent a race to the bottomof labor standards
in the North.6 On the other hand developing countries consider these kinds of
measures as a sort of protectionism.
In the present paper, we use an incentive based-approach to assess the ef-
ciency of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of
international labour standards in Developing Countries. We focus on the incen-
tive of the rm7 , operating in low standards countries, to comply with labour
standards.
The basic idea is that it exists a political demand from people in industri-
alised countries for higher LS in developing countries. It means that there are
consumers who are willing to pay a premium price for good produced under
3The concept of unfair trade is related to the idea of unfair competition, that is the
ability of a rm to hold on to an industry is compromised by the fact that one rivals abroad
do not carry the same burden. (Bhagwati, 1995)
4Historical evidences show how the level of labor standards increases with the economic
development of a country. In US the Fair Labor Standard Act, the rst federal law that
established a minimum wage, guaranted a maximum amount of works hours and prohibit
most employment of minors in oppressive child laborwas enacted in 1938.
5Social dumping refers to a situation in which rms, that are located in countries where
labor standards are lax, produce and export goods at excessively low prices by using cheap
labor under poor working condition (Corden and Vousden, 2001).
6The idea is to give back the money gained from tari¤s by funding aid programs for
Developing Countries.
7We focus on the rm in developing countries and not on the government since: a)rms are
directly a¤ected by these kinds of measures, b)government in the south are often weak, there is
corruption, lack of security, weak bureaucracy and monitoring system, c)national mandatory
law are often not well dened and this make di¢ cult the enforcement mechanism.
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acceptable working condions (responsible consumers), private investors who
care on ethical issue (socially responsible investing) and government or in-
stitutions (such as European Union) who gives nancial aid in order to induce
rms to comply with labour standards (e.g. nancial contribution in Corporate
Social Responsability activities of the rm). 8Indeed, it seems it exists a market
for LS (Freeman, 2003) and rms could produce these kinds of social goodin
order to satisfy this demand. Since producing social goodimplies higher cost
of production, a rm has an incentive to produce them if and only if benets
are higher than costs. Since we are in the case of asymmetric information (i.e.
consumer does not know the quality of the good), benets are higher than costs
if and only if the rm can signal the true quality to the consumer (positive pub-
licity) or if it exists the probability to be monitored and discovered (negative
publicity).
Nelson (1970), Darby and Karni (1973) developed an useful categorization
between search, experience and credence goods. Search attributes are those for
which consumers can assess their quality before purchasing them (i.e. clothes,
shoes). Experience attributes are those for which consumers cannot assess the
quality until they have purchased and consumed them (i.e. cars). Credence
attributes are those for which consumers can assess the quality neither before
nor after purchase and use them. Therefore, the goods attributes are not evident
since refer mainly on the production process.
Indeed, consumers and public authorities, in the wealthier and more indus-
trialized countries, have increasely pay attention to the production process of a
good such as its environmental impact, ethical content (Auriol, Schilizzi, 2003).
We assume all along the paper that a rm, that operates in the South, can
choose three levels of labour standards: operate under the minimum standard
(Core Labour Standard-CLS)9 , comply with CLS or overcomply with CLS. For
overcomplying with CLS, we mean comply with safety conditions, living wage,
minimum hours of work, etc. Obviously, the choise of the rm will depend on
the cost and benet derived by its own decision.
First we want to assess the e¢ ciency of trade policy instruments for the
promotion of labour standards in Developing Countries, by using an incentive
based-approach. We consider the case where the choice of a cashless rm is
comply or not comply with CLS. In this case the qualityof the good may be
signaled if and only if there is a monitoring mechanism which provides addi-
8Socially Responsible Investment (SRI): SRI assets rose more than 324 percent from
$639 billion in 1995 (the year of the rst Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in
the United States) to $2.71 trillion in 2007. During the same period, the broader universe
of assets under professional management increased less than 260 percent from $7 trillion to $
25.1 trillion (2007 Report on SRI in USA, Social Investment Forum).
Some proposals from International Community for the promotion of Core Labour Standards:
new GSP scheme from 2002 for EU, negative import tari¤s.
9Core Labour Standards are the standard recognized as universal and absolute by the
ILO Declaretion of 1998: no forced labor; freedom of assosiation; no discrimination at the
workplace; elimination of child labor. Note that undercomplying with CLS is often the case in
several developing countries. Even if almost all developing countries signed ILO Fundamental
Conventions, there is an ine¢ cient enforcement mechanism within the country. Therefore it
is nally possible for a rm to operate under CLS.
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tional information on the rms behaviour10 or if an external event occurs, i.e.
probability to be detected violating LS. Indeed, since CLS are minimum legal
standards, we assume that a cashless rm does not have private incentives to
invest in the project and to signal the quality of the good. In this rst part, we
assume that the North gives a transfer to a Southern rm in order to nance the
project "improving working conditions in the South".11 We analyze the moral
hazard question raised by the fact that rms in the South control LS, through
its own e¤ort. The optimal nancial contract under asymmetric information is
characterized. Finally, we analyse the role of NGO, as intermediar, in providing
additional information on the rm behaviour in order to achieve the optimal
contract.
Then, we want to investigate the role of private schemes for the promotion
of labour standards. We assume that the rm has an initial asset that invests
in order to di¤erentiate its product, by complying with social standards", i.e.
living wage12 , hours of work, safety and healthy condition. Since we deal with
credence goods and production cost increase with quality, rm has an incen-
tive to di¤erentiate its product if and only if it can signal the true quality to
the consumer.
However, let us consider a rm that operates in the South. The rm can
a)sell its products in the domestic market; b)enter in the international market;
c)produce for a MNE as a subcontractor; d)being a part of joint venture or
being owned by an other rm (vertical or horizontal integration).
If the rm produce for the domestic market, since we have assumed that
there is not a domestic demand for higher labour standards in the South, rm
will never comply with LS if weak enforcement institutions persist.
If a rm enters in the international market rm will comply with CLS if and
only if its benet are higher than the costs.13Melitz (2003) shows how, with
heterogeneneous rms, the exposure to trade will induce only the more pro-
ductive rms to enter the export market. These rms have more informations,
expertise capacity, skill labour, technology. Preferential import tari¤s, such as
Generalized System of Preferences (e.g. "GSP plus") may reduce the cost of
export and induce more rms to enter in the international market and therefore
comply with CLS.
Indeed, in the North it exists an increasing demand of "social good", i.e.
goods produced under acceptable working conditions.14 Firm that want to
10An NGO may use negative publicity by providing information to consumers associa-
tions, investor; writing annual reports to the political authority or institution, who has invested
money in ethical project.
11This transfer from the North is represented by increasing investments, such as socially
responsible investing, the willingness of consumers to pay a premium price for a fair good;
subsidies given to rms for ethical programby political authorities in the North.
12Note that the decision of the rm is a continum of choice. Indeed, in developing countries
it is more usefull to talk about average wage rather than minimum wage.
13Notice that all along the paper we consider the level of labour standards within the rm
as an endogenous variable. This assumption is justied by the fact that in several developing
countries rm can under comply, comply or overcomply with CLS due to the weak enforcement
mechanism.
14The 2003 Corporate Social Responsability Monitor estimate that the amount of con-
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"capture" these consumers has to invest additional resources, in order to dif-
ferentiate its products. Auriol and Schilizzi (2003) show that a rm producing
credence goods has to pay a sunk cost in order to be a credible seller. This sunk
cost covers the cost of signaling the "quality" and creates a barrier to entry in
the market. This implies an oligopoly market. But a limit of this analysis is the
assumption of a perfect certication process, such that "labeling" transforms a
credence good in search good. This is feasible in the case of a single rm (or ver-
tical/horizontal integrated rm) that invests in the project and where it exists a
credible certication mechanism (private or public). This is what characterizes
the "fair trade market" or "organic farming" market. These markets base on a
third party that certies the process of production.
We analyse the interesting and less treated case of a Southern rm that
produce for a MNE as a subcontractor. What does it imply?
A subcontractor can work for more than one MNE at the same time. There-
fore, a subcontractor does not have any direct benet from "reputation e¤ect" of
the MNE, achieved by signaling the "quality" of the good (e.g. "green goods",
"ethical goods").
We consider the case where a wealthier rm of the North (e.g. a MNE), that
subcontracts with a Southern rm, has private benets to invest in ethical
project. We assume the existence of an "Ethical Firm"15 , that monitors the
subcontractor of MNEs in order to increase its market share by damaging to
the "reputation" of the MNE. We formalize the action of this "ethical rm", as
an external shock that can reduce the prots of the MNE. This external shock
is the probability that the subcontractor is discovered cheating. In this case,
MNE can be damaged by a negative publicity.
In the present analysis, the investment of the MNE involves limiting the
damage to the Brand that can be inected by "negative publicity". The idea is
how approach the risk-management side of Corporate Social Responsibility.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we analyse the issue
of Labour Standards in Developing Countries and recent proposals by the In-
ternational Community to improve working conditions in the South. In section
three we present the model. First, we analyse which are the incentive of a rm
operating in the South to comply with core labour standards. The model is
related to two literatures. The rst is related to the principal-agent literature
where monitoring additional information on the agent helps to solve moral haz-
ard problem (Harris-Raviv, 1979; Diamond, 1984). The other related literature
is that based on nancial intermediation under asymmetric information. Then
we examine the incentives of a Northern rm that subcontracts with a Southern
sumer that take into account the social responsability in their purchaise decision rose from
36% in 1999 to 62% in 2001 in Europe.
15 In the last years "ethical" products have notably increased, in reaction to bad working
conditions imposed to workers in textile indutry, especially in the production of sport clothes
and shoes. Some Brands in this "new" sector: Timao, Mestres, Misericordia, Tudo Bom,
Vejas and Ethletic. The word "ethical" refers to di¤erent practices, since for the time being
it does not exist an international label in this sector. However, these "ethical" rms follow
essentially fair trade criteria: right wage, stable relation with the suppliers and compliance
with workers rights as claimed by ILO.
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rm to invest in "ethical project", in order to di¤erentiate its products. We
analyse the optimal contract in an advese selection problem. The paper ends
with conclusions and questions for further research.
2 Labour Standards in developing countries
In 1998 it was signed the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights
at Work. The International Labour Conference declares that  all Members,
even if they have not ratied the Fundamental Conventions16 , have an oblig-
ation arising from the fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to
promote and to realize, (...), the principles concerning the fundamental rights
which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: freedom of association, the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, the e¤ective abolition
of child labour; the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation. Therefore what is called Core Labour Standards(CLS) became
a component of universal human rights.
The frequently used expression social standards extends far beyond the
core labor standard, in that it includes requirements such as health care, job
security, limitations on hours of work and minimun wage. These labor standards
are less universaly accepted.
Therefore how can we limit the notion of human rights? Are labor standards
universal or is a matter to be decided by sovreign nations?
There is a low domestic demand for higher LS in developing countries, weak
bureaucracy and monitoring system.
Labor unions in the South are not yet well organized or they are often illegal
organizations in the country17 . The low demand of higher labor standards in
the South is also related to the high rate of unemployment18 . Moreover, a lot
of developing countries have ine¢ cient national monitoring system, due to their
weak bureaucracy and lack of resources.
All these di¢ culties in the South contribute also to create a sort of monop-
sonistic power in the labor market. In such a case rm can pay its workers
below the marginal value product of labor. Jinji (2005) considers such a case as
the source of social dumping.
16The Fundamental Conventions are: C. 29 and C.105 on forced labour; C.87 and C.98 on
freedom of association; C.100 and C.111 on Discrimination; C.138 and C.182 on Child Labor.
17However in some developing countries unions are a force for democracy and the protection
of human rights. For instance, since the late 1990s, Zimbabwes trade unions have been the
main opponent of Robert Mugabes dictatorship. Unions were also a leading force in the
campaign against apartheid in South Africa (Freeman 2003).
18 In many Least developed countries, discrimination discourages female employment outside
of sectors requiring less-skilled work in low-wage industries such as clothing, footwear, and
toys. The result is a large supply of female workers in that sector, which lowers price and
increases production and export of clothing relative to what would happen otherwise (Freeman,
2003).
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Several Developing Countries have ratied almost all Fundamental ILO Con-
ventions19 . However, what does it mean dene core labor standards as manda-
tory international standards if does not exist an International legal Institution
able to enforce them?
Indeed, even if a Country does not have a complete system of national law
on labour standards, it has to comply with CLS due to the ILO Declaration
of 199820 . However, the ILO has not a specic legal instrument able to en-
force the compliance with CLS. It exists other complaint procedures but they
are not e¤ective. In the last decades, some industrialized countries, as Euro-
pean Union, have introduced autonomous measures to suspend development
co-operation or Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benets in cases of
grave and persistent violation of Core LS21 .
There are di¤erent proposals to raise the level of LS in Developing Countries,
without conversely a¤ecting their economic development. The European Union,
for instance, in order to avoid a race to the bottomin respect of labour stan-
dards, adopts a policy of incentives in the form of additional tari¤ preferences.
This policy has been implemented in the framework of the EUs Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP)22 . It concerns positive instruments used to induce
Developing Countries to raise the level of LS. This kind of meseaures do not
make provision for sanctions (negative instrument). However, these special in-
centives arrangements for the protection of labour standards are available upon
request. Therefore, in order to benet of these special tari¤s, the Country has
to make a specic request that is afterward carried out by the Commision. In
order to conform to the requirement, it is su¢ cient that the substance of the
standards concerned (core labor standards) is incorporated in the domestic leg-
islation. Is it really a su¢ cient condition? In many developing countries, even
if these standards are incorporated in the domestic legislation, employers of-
ten do not comply with them. Moreover, we have to keep in mind that a lot
of workers in developing countries are engaged in employment without written
contracts and this represents a strong limit to the enforcement and monitoring of
LS. Indeed, having no written contracts means that workers may be unaware of
their rights and responsibilities and perceived as engaged in an informal rather
than a formal working relationship23 . Indeed, in many developing countries the
19On average, 149 of the ILOs 175 members have ratied each of the eight core coventions,
and 86 have ratied all of them (Freeman, 2003).
20For instance, as reported by an ILO study: Indonesia has an impressive record ratifying
international conventions. Although Indonesia is responsible to the International community
for implementing the agreements it raties, it is unclear whether the substance of agreements
is not binding domestically unless it is incorporated into a specic law.
21Communication from the commission to the Council, the Europea parliament and the
economic and social Committee, :Promoting core labour standards and improving social
governance in the context of globalization, COM(2001)416 nal.
22The Generalised System of Preferences was recommended by UNCTAD in 1968. Ac-
cording to this system, industrialised countries would grant autonomous trade preferences
to all developing countries. The EU started to adopt GSP scheme in 1971. The GSP may
concern duty free access or tari¤ reduction it depends if there are sensitive or non-sensistive
products.
23 ILO Report (2006):  The Regulation of Domestic workers in Indonesia.
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informal sector represents a large sector of the economy. The informal sector
encompasses largely unrecognized, unrecorded and unregulated small-scale ac-
tivities. It includes small enterprises with hired workers, household enterprises
using family labour and the self-employed.24 This is an important issue that
has to be better analysed.
A more frequentely used practice by industrialised countries, is to insert the
recognition and promotion of social right into bilateral trade agreements.25
The EU has also increased the nancial support for the engagement of the
private sector (rm and non-governmenal organization) in the promotion of
social standards, as a support to what is called fair trade. An other proposals
recently suggested by a group of NGOs is to apply a negative import tari¤s for
rm operating in low standards countries. A negative tari¤ may be dened as
a form of subsidy. Therefore this may represent a positive incentive to induce
Southern rm to improve working conditions of its employees.
3 Basic model
3.1 Political demand of CLS
The model is based on the assumption that people in the North are averse to low
labor standards in the South. For the sake of simplicity we assume that in the
North rms fully comply with high LS. This aversion of low labor standards in
the South can be captured by the increasing attention to the ethical issuein
the North, represented by increasing investments, such as socially responsible
investing; the willingness of consumers to pay a premium price for a fair
good; subsidies given to rms for ethical programby political authorities in
the North.
In this rst part we assume that the choice of a Southern rm is to: a)
comply with CLS, b) not comply with CLS. We assume that complying with
CLS requires an initial investment. A cashless rm complies with LS if and
only if benets are higher than costs. We assume that higher labour standards
imply high cost of production C, while low LS imply low cost of production C.
Therefore costs of production C 2 C
¯
, C
	
:A cashless rm in order to invest
in this project need external nancing.26We consider a two-period model with
24As underlined by ILOs World Employment Report 1998-99, the informal sector is a
major provider of urban jobs. In Africa employment accounts for over 60% of total urban
employment. Among individual countries for which statistics are available, the gures reach
57% in Bolivia, 56% in Tanzania, 53% in Colombia, 48% in Thailand and 46% in Venezuela.
In the analysis that follows we refer mainly on the formal sector. The relationship between
informal sector and labor standard is an other important issue.
25Such a practice could have negative impacts on Developing Countries since they are obliged
to raise the level of LS in order to preserve trade relations. It is still an exogenous way to
raise the level of LS in the South.
26This assumption is made in order to consider the usual case where a prot maximising
rm tend to keep low labour standards in order to minimize cost of production. Recall that
we have assumed that comply with LS implies higher cost of production.
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three parties: rm, investors and an intermediar. All parties are risk neutral.27
In the rst period lending takes place and in the second period there is the
realization of the project and the repayment to the uninformed investor if the
project succeds. The project yields R with probability p and 0 with probability
1 p. This probability of success depends on the decision of the rm, i.e. comply
(C) or not comply (NC). The stochastic output is related to the charachteristics
of the good, i.e. credence attributes. It is pc if rm comply and pn if rm does
not comply, where pc > pn: In the case of perfect observability, the outcome is
not stochastic, because the quality of the good is perfectly observable by the
principal. In the case of imperfect observability of the outcome, the probability
to have a successfully project are:
prob (R=NC) = pn > 0
prob (R=CO) = pc > 0
A contract between the North and the Southern rm species a given trans-
fer T to the rm if the return is R and 0 otherwise. The contract is f0; Tg :28
In our analysis, the principal can be identied with a political authority or
an institution (i.e. the governement of the North) who nances ethical pro-
gram29 ; while the intermediar can be identied with an NGO who has the task
to monitor the rm.
Since complying with CLS implies higher cost of production, if rm does not
comply with, it can produce at a lower cost. Notice that this condition derive
from the fact that consumer cannot assess the qualityof the good. A "social
good" is charachterized by credence attributes. Indeed, a rm, in the absence of
right incentive or outside monitoring may deliberately reduce the probability of
success in order to enjoy lower cost of production. The moral hazard problem
is related to the asymmetric information between the principal (i.e. the North)
and the agent (i.e. the rm) on the decision made by the rm.
3.1.1 Full observability
We consider rst the case where the outcome of the project "improving working
conditions in the South" is perfectly observable by the North. In this case
an optimal contract is a contract where the North cover the total cost of the
project T ; R = 0 and T = 0 if the project fail; if the project succed the rm has
R  C + T > 0. The return of the project for the North is z > T , where z is a
form of "moral Return" for the North. This condition derives by the assumption
27All along the paper, the risk neutrality assumption implies that the rm even if it is made
liable if it does not comply fully with CLS, it prefers to run the risk of bankruptcy rather
than pay an insurance. The rm is the residual claimant.
28Notice that if R = 0; T = 0:We assume limited liability for the agent.
29Let consider for instance the European Union who decides to apply preferential import
tari¤s for rms operating in low standards countries in order to give a positive incentive to
the rm to comply with CLS.
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that the North is averse to poor working conditions in the South. The North
gives a transfer T to the South in order to improve working conditions and
increase its own utility.While the return R  C + T > 0 can be considered as a
reputation e¤ect for the rm. A rm that fully comply with CLS continues
to enjoy preferential import tari¤s and benet from an increasing consumers
demand and outside investment.30
We assume that the decision of the rm to comply with CLS depends on the
probability to have the transfer T :We dene  the probability to be discovered
dishonest and (1  ) the probability to be not discovered.
The project is nanced if and only if
R  C + T  R  C + (1  )T (1)
R  C + T  0 (2)
z  T (3)
where (1) is the Incentive compatible constraint of the rm, (2) is the par-
ticipation constraint of the rm and (3) is the non-negative prot condition for
the uninformed investor.If there is perfect observability of the outcome  = 1;
therefore by substituting (3) in (1), we get the necessary condition to have the
project nanced:
T  C   C (4)
where T is the transfer given to the South and C C
¯
> 0 represent the
di¤erential cost of the rm to comply with CLS.
Lemma 1 A project is nanced if and only if the transfer T cover the total
cost of the project C C
¯
> 0 . With perfect observability of the outcome, the
incentive for the rm to nance the project and to comply fully with CLS is that
the transfer given by the North is higher than the di¤erential cost of complying
with CLS.
30Recall that we have assumed that people in the North are averse to poor working condi-
tions in the South, and therefore their utility increase if poor working condition decrease.
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3.1.2 Imperfect observability
In this second part we analyse the case where the outcome of the project is
observable just by the rm. Indeed, this is the case in the reality since a "social
good" has credence attributes. The consumer cannot assess the quality of the
good neither befor nor after purchase it. Therefore, let assume that condition
(4) is not satised. This is represented by the fact that the cost of fully comply
with CLS (i.e. the opportunity cost to be diligent for the rm) increases since
the output is never observable by the principal. But we assume that pcR+z > T
. Therefore, it still exists a positive return in participating into the project.
T < C   C
¯
but pcR+ z > T
With imperfect observability of the outcome, it is always feasible for the
rm to claim that he has fully complied with CLS, and keep the total transfer
of the North, equal to T; and produce at a lower cost C
¯
.31 The assumption of
imperfect observability comes from the characteristics of the outcome. Recall
that the project nanced is improving working conditions in the Southand it
refers to the process of production of the good (i.e. credence attributes).
By assuming imperfect observability of the outcome by the investor, if the
choice of the rm is to Comply with CLS (C) or Not Comply with CLS (NC)
and the choice of the investor is Invest (I) or Not Invest (NI), the expected
payo¤ matrix of this game is thus
I NI
C pcR  C + T ;  T pcR  C ; z
NC pnR+ T   C¯ ;  T pnR  C¯ ; 0
It is immediate to check that it exists a unique Nash equilibrium in dominant
strategy, that is fNC;NIg :
In this case, if (4) is not satised but pcR + z > T , the North has to pay
an additional cost in order to induce the rm to fully comply with CLS. We
assume that the North decides to cover the cost of monitoring the rm in order
to solve the observability problem. The investor can use a direct monitoring
or delegates it to an intermediair. Monitoring rm implies an investment that
costs m > 0; in order to cover the physical cost of monitoring K, e.g. conduct
a workplace inspection. We assume that for the North is too expensive to
introduce a monitoring technology (i.e. direct monitoring), because he does not
have informational expertise. Let consider an investor who lives in the North
who want to monitor a rm that operates in the South. In this case it is more
e¢ cient (i.e. reduce cost of monitoring) to monitor on behalf of others. We
assume also that rms cannot monitor other rms, because they have insu¢ cient
31Firm can cheat since the outcome is not observed by the uninformed investor.
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capital to be credible monitors. Therefore, we assume that investor hires an
agent, e.g an NGO, in order to monitor the rm and reduce its opportunity
cost to be diligent. We assume that the intermediary is a risk neutral agent
with initial wealth equal to zero.32 We assume that the NGO has the same
objective of the North, i.e. improving working conditions in the South. For
the present analysis other assumptions on the "hired agent" behaviour are not
necessary.33 We focus on the role of a monitoring mechanism in order to solve
the observability problem.We assume also that monitoring by the intermediar is
not infallible, that is if the rm is monitored it is detected as disohnest at some
probability . By covering the cost of monitoring, the North can catch the rm
if it cheats, in this case the rm is punished and receives 0:34
As we have explained above, the realization of R depends on the decision of
the rm. Obviously, is more probable to be recognized as "social rm" if rm
fully comply with CLS. Since the random output is observed just by the rm,
the North must give incentives to the rm in order to be diligent.
Therefore, rm will always choose not comply with CLS, since it is feasible
and the outcome is observable just by it. In order to be incentive compatible for
the rm to choose to comply with CLS, we introduce a non-pecuniary penalty
 at the end of period 1, if rm is discovered been cheating by the NGO. By
following Diamond (1984), for non-pecuniary penalty we mean a penalty where
the rms loss is not enjoyed by the investor. Indeed, we consider the non-
pecuniary penalty the negative publicitymade by the intermediary against
the rm. This negative publicityimplies a reduction of rms prot.
The timing of event is summerized below:
t1 monitoring t2
contract takes place pcR+T  C > 0 if firm C
pnR C¯  < 0 if firm NC
32 Indeed this is the case for NGO. The project realized by the NGO are always funded by
external parties:private sector or public authorities. Therefore NGO does not have its own
initial assets to invest in monitoring activities.
33 Indeed, also for the NGO there could be some incentive compatible constraints. NGO
can deliberately made ine¢ cient monitoring in order to not solve completely the problem and
keep their job. The role of NGO and the competition among them is an important issue for
further research.
34This is a dept contract, that is no money being left to the borrower in the bad state of
nature and the residual being pocketed by the lender in the good state of nature.
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Since the outcome of the project is observable just by the rm, the rm can
claim complying with CLS.35 The choices of the rm still are Comply (C) or
Not Comply (NC) with CLS, and now, since condition (4) is not satised, the
choice of the investor is to Monitor (M) and Not Monitor (NM) the rm.
The expected payo¤ matrix of this game is:
C NC
M z   T  m; PcR+ T   C z   T  m;  
NM z   T; PcR+ T   C  T; pnR  C¯ + T
It is easy to see that it does not exists a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy,
since the decision of one agent causes the opposite decision of the other.
Therefore with imperfect observability of the outcome the project is nanced
if and only if:
z   T  m  0 (5)
s.t
pcR  C + T  pnR  C¯ + (1  )T    (6)
pcR  C + T  0 (7)
where (5) is the non-negative prot condition of the North, condition (6) and
(7) are respectively the incentive compatible constraint and the participation
constraint of the rm. The NGO is an additional agent hired by the uninformed
investor in order to monitor the rm. As aforementioned, we assume that the
NGO has the same objective of the North, i.e. improve working conditions in
the south. In this case, for the NGO is always incentive compatible to monitor
in an e¢ cient way. This assumption is justied by the fact that the NGO has
initial wealth equal to 0 and by choosing high e¤ort (i.e. using all payment
m to monitor), it can in turn signal the quality of his job to other investors
(reputation e¤ect) and receive increasing fundings.36
By solving (6), (7), and (8) with equalities (constraint are binding), we
obtain:
35Notice that this is the opposite case of a nancial contract where it is not incentive
compatible for the rm to choose a repayment z > 0, when z = 0 is feasible. Indeed, in our
analysis the rm has no incentive to declare R = 0 and therefore z = 0; since the repayment
to the investor is the provision of this public good, and if there is not a monitoring mechanism
nobody can check if the rm really contributes or not.
36Note that we consider NGO as an intermediary who participates in the nancial contract
to get a return m K: But NGOs are characterized also by their paternalistic altruismand
therefore they gain an additional satisfaction in contributing to the provision of this public
good.
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[pn   (1  )pc]R = C¯   (1  )
C +  (8)
If the probability to be discovered dishonest is  = 0; we have:
R =
C
p
(9)
If the probability to be discovered dishonest is  = 1; the optimal level of
penalty is:
pnR  C¯ = 
 (10)
Proposition 2 In the case of imperfect observability of the outcome, when the
probability for the rm to be discovered is  = 0; the level of non-pecuniary
penalty is zero,  = 0. Firm will comply i¤ pc > pn (by assumption) and the
return are higher than the di¤erential cost, otherwise rm will never comply
with CLS. If the probability to be discovered is  = 1, a credible monitoring
mechanism requires a level of penalty such that the return of the rm of not
comply with CLS is completely eliminated.
Proof. The investor can increase the value of the penalty by some arbitrarly
small " > 0 and increase its return without violating both IR an IC constraints.
Specically, the investor can raise the penalty by " such that pnR C¯  = 0: Ifthe value of  is lower than pnR C¯ ; the rm still has pnR C¯  > 0, thereforehe always chooses not comply with CLS in order to reduce the cost of production.
The non-pecuniary penalty, due to the altruistic behaviour of the North37 ,
and the fact that rm does not invest its own asset in the project determine
this results.
Therefore a credible monitoring mechanismrequires an initial invetsment,
a credible institution who support it and a penalty to the rm if detected. Since
monitoring has a cost m, the North will give the transfer to the Southern rm
i¤:
z  T +m (11)
37Recall that we do not consider monetary return for the investor. The repayment z is just
the utility derived by the provision of public good.
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3.2 Investment in product di¤erentiation
Suppose now that the rm has an initial asset and he has private benet in
nancing the project. The project is still improving working conditions in the
South, but now a wealthier rm has private benet in nancing it. As we have
shown, a cashless rm will always comply with CLS if condition (9) and (10) are
satised. Otherwise the opportunity cost to be diligent for the rm is too high
and therefore rm will never comply with CLS if there is a weak enforcement
mechanism.38
Let consider now the case where a wealthier rm can invest its initial asset
in the project in order to have higher return. We assume that investment can
be undertaken at any scale I: The hypothesis of a cashless and a wealthier
rm stress the relationship between the credit constraint of the rm and its
compliance with LS in a developing countries. A m that does not have enough
resources to be devoted in improving working conditions of its employees get
just subsidies from the North. While a rm that has enough resources can also
invest its own asset in the project in order to di¤erentiate its products.
By a di¤erentiated good, we mean a good produced in compliance with "so-
cial standards" i.e. living wage, hours of works, safety and healthy conditions.39
We assume now that the choice of the rm is a) comply with CLS; b) overcomply
with CLS (i.e.minimum standard) that requires an additional investment. As
we have explained above, for credence good, such as social good, the private
market for quality works ine¢ ciently due to imperfect information (i.e. con-
sumer do not know the quality of the good neither before nor after purchase
them), transaction costs in acquiring and using information and externality, if
the good has characteristics of public good. Caswell and Mojduska (1996) show
how a quality signaling through a label can give information to the consumer
and reduce the cost of intervention of the government. By following Caswell
and Mojduska (1996), a rm will invest in the project if and only if it can signal
the true quality to the consumer by labeling.40
Let now consider the compliance with LS by a rm operating in low stan-
dards countries. We focus on the interesting and not yet treated case of a
Southern rm that produce for a MNE as a subcontractor.
In the last decades, several MNEs have transfered part of their production
to domestic rms in developing countries.This happens especially in the man-
ufacturing sector, where the main factor of production is unskilled labour. For
instance rms as Hasbro (toys manufacturer), Nike, Adidas, GAP, etc., move
their production to China and subcontract with a Chinese company. This form
38The existence of weak enforcement institutions in Developing Countries is the key as-
sumption all along the paper. It increases notably the cost of comply with labour standards
since with a lack of enforcement mechanism the strategy of not comply is the optimal one for
a prot maximising rm.
39Report of the European Communities Commission. COM(2001) 416 nal.
40The basic assumption of the model remains that people in the North are averse to low
labour standards in the South. It means that there are people who are willing to pay a premium
price for good produced under good working conditions. In such a case also producers have
incentives to signal high quality or to build the reputation of being a high quality producer.
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of organization of the rm implies even higher cost of asymmetric information
between the upward and downward supplier, than a form of vertical integration
of the rm (Arrow 1975, Aghion and Tirole, 1997). However, subcontracting
avoids costs of information of the host market that rm has to pay for FDI.
What does it imply? A subcontractor can work for more than one MNE at
the same time. This implies any specic "relationship" between a MNE and a
subcontractor. The subcontractor does not have any direct benet from "repu-
tation e¤ect" of the MNE, achieved by signaling the "quality" of the goods (e.g.
"green goods", "ethical products"). Indeed, subcontractors produce a part of
the nal good or they produce for di¤erent Brands. Therefore, workers do not
feel a part of the MNE, who push those contractors to cut costs and to be more
and more productive.
This determines a problem of asymmetric information between the "genereal
contractor" (e.g. MNE) and the subcontractor.
We want to focus our analysis on the incentives of a MNE, that subcontracts
with a rm operating in low standards countries, to invest in "ethical project".
The main assumption is that the subcontractor serves at the same time di¤erent
"brands". Then, the MNE, who invests in the project, has to provide the right
incentives to induce the subcontractor to overcomply with CLS. The menu of
contract is a specic level of transfer if the subcontractor overcomply with CLS.
The subcontractor can use this transfer in order to improve working conditions
of its employes or keep the transfer and lie (i.e. not overcomply with CLS).
We consider a risk averse principal, i.e. a MNE, who makes a contract to
a risk neutral agent, the subcontractor. To simplify the analysis we assume
that the MNE has full bargaining power in determining the contract with the
subcontractor and the latter has a positive reservation utility (i.e. outside op-
portunity). The assumption of a positive reservation utility is used in order to
take into account the fact that the subcontractor can works also for other rms.
The basic idea is that, due to this increasing demand of "social good" in
the North, a MNE can increase its prot by di¤erentiating its goods and sig-
naling the "quality" to the consumer (reputation e¤ect). However, due to weak
enforcement mechanism in the south and the outside opportunity, the subcon-
tractor can increase its prot by keep the transfer and lie, i.e. not overcomply
with CLS. Therefore, which is the cost for a MNE to invest in "ethical project"
and di¤erentiate its goods?
We assume the existence of an "Ethical Firm", e.g Oxfam, that monitors
the subcontractor in order to increase its market share by damaging to the
"reputation" of the MNE.41 We formalize the action of this "ethical rm" as an
external shock that can reduce prots of the MNE. This external shock is the
probability that the subcontractor is discovered cheating and therefore MNE
can be damaged by a negative publicity.
The subcontractor makes a prot t c(l)  u, where c(l) is the cost of raising
LS, t is the transfer payed by the MNE and u > 0 is a strictly positive reservation
utility. We assume that c0 > 0 and c00 > 0: The parameter ; drawn from
41We assume that the "ethical rm" produce the same product of the MNE.
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 =

; 
	
;is how much the subcontractor values the loss of being discovered
cheating. The subcontractor attach an high value to the loss with probability p
or a low value with probability 1   p. In this case, the bad type  want to
mimick the good type : Indeed, the subcontractor with an high loss value is
more willing to use the transfer in order to overcomply with CLS, because if he
is discovered cheating the loss may be too high.42
Therefore, the MNE must o¤er a menu of contracts before knowing which
type of agent he is facing. Therefore he will compute the benet of any menu
of contracts
 
t; l

; (t; l)
	
in expected terms.
The objective function of the MNE is V = v(l) t; where v(l) is the monetary
return of raising the level of LS (i.e. di¤erentating its good), and t is the transfer
payed to the subcontractor, i.e. the cost of raising LS. We assume v0 > 0,
v00 < 0 and v(0) = 0:
By following Freeman (2003), we assume that the incentive of a MNE to
invest in "ethical project" depends on the probability to be a¤ected by a nega-
tive publicity rather than making "positive publicity". Therefore, if the MNE
invests in "ethical project", he can have negative prot with probability  (i.e.
probability to not be monitored). Recall that "social goods" are "credence
goods". Consumer cannot assess the quality of the good neither before nor af-
ter purchase them. Since we are in the case of asymmetric information, benets
are higher than the costs if and only if rm can signal the true quality to the
consumer (positive publicity) or it it exists the probability to be monitored and
discovered (negative publicity).
Notice that the decision of the MNE and the subcontractor depends on
how much the subcontractor values the loss of being discovered cheating. This
is true under the assumption that the outside option does not depend on the
probability to be monitored. In the second part, we analyse the case by relaxing
this assumption.
The presence of weak enforcement institutions in developing countries de-
termines this results. Since there is not a "court of justice" that can enforce
the contract and give punishment, this notably reduces the value that the rm
attach to the loss of being discovered cheating. Therefore, when the downward
supplier does not loose directly by the loss of "credibility" of the upward sup-
plier, what matter for the principal is how much the subcontractor evaluates its
loss and not the probability to be discovered. Indeed, if p decreases, it means
that the probability that  = increase and therefore the subcontractor does
not have any incentive to overcomply with CLS.
3.2.1 Perfect information
In the case of perfect information the MNE will maximize its prot subject to
the participation constraint of the subcontractor:
42 If a negative publicity a¤ect also the prot of the subcontractor, its opportunity cost to
overcomply with CLS is lower.
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max
(t;l)
v(l)  t (12)
s.t.
t  c(l) = u (13)
By solving the maximization problem we get the rst best level of l and t :
for  = 
v0(l) =  c0(l) (14)
tFB =  c(lFB) + u (15)
for  =
v0(lFB) =  c0(lFB) (16)
tFB =  c(lFB) + u (17)
The optimal level of labour standard is where the marginal utility of the
MNE equals the marginal cost of raising labour standards of the subcontrac-
tor given the parameter :While the optimal level of transfer has to be higher
enough in order to cover the cost of raising LS and the outside option of the
subcontractor.
3.2.2 Imperfect information
A strictly positive outside opportunity. Let us now consider the case
of asymmetric information. The subcontractor s participation and incentive
compatible constraints, respectively for the low type and high type are:
t   c(l)  u (18)
t   c(l)  u
t   c(l)  t   c(l) (19)
t   c(l)  t   c(l) (20)
By Revelation principle, without loss of generality, we have:
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c(l)  c(l) (21)
Due to asymmetric information, MNE cannot implement the rst best con-
tract. Therefore, let us derive the second best contract. MNE wants to have an
optimal level of LS at a minimum cost. Therefore, we have to minimize cost in
U =
 
t; l; t; l
 2 R+ =   t+  c(l) + u = 0; t+  c(l) + t   c(l) = 0	
The MNEs maximisation problem is then:
max
(t;l;t;l)

p(v(l)  t) + (1  p) (v(l)  t) (1  p) (22)
s.t
t   c(l) = u (23)
t   c(l) = t   c(l) (24)
Where (1  ) is the probability to be monitored.
Let us denote the respective multipliers of these constraints with  and :
Optimizing with respect to t; l; t; l we obtain:
pv0(lSB) + (  + (1  p) )c0(lSB) = 0 (25)
(1  p) v0(lSB) + (p  1)  c0(lSB) = 0 (26)
tSB =  c(lSB) + u (27)
tSB =
 
c(lSB)  c(lSB)  +  c(lSB) + u (28)
Or put it di¤erently:
pv0(lSB) =  (1  p) c0(lSB) (29)
v0(lSB) =  c0(lSB) (30)
If p = 0, the second best solution for the MNE is lSB = 0:If p = 1, MNE
will choose a level of LS where lSB = l:
Let now analyse the level of LS required for the bad type. By condition
(28), if p = 1; we get lSB = 0 (shutdown policy); if p = 0; the level of LS in the
second best framework is lSB = l:
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Finally, the level of LS chosen by the MNE (i.e. comply or overcomply with
CLS) can be:
0  lSB  l (31)
0  lSB = l (32)
Therefore the level of investment in LS depends on the probability p:
While the level of transfer that the MNE has to pay to the subcontractor in
order to induce the subcontractor to choose the right contract are:
tSB =  c(lSB) + u
) tSB = t
Therefore the MNE has to pay a transfer high enough in order to cover the
opportunity cost of the subcontractor of overcomplying with CLS due to its
positive reservation utility. If the outside opportunity of the subcontractor is
high its opportunity cost to comply with the contract is higher and therefore
the subcontractor will never overcomply with CLS. By rewriting condition (28),
we get the second best level of transfer for the low type:
tSB = c(lSB)| {z }
cost for low type
+ c(lSB)| {z }
information rent
+ u|{z}
outside opportunity
(33)
) tSB t
We can conclude that the level of transfer depends on the investment decision
in "improving wotking conditions in the South" of the MNE. If the MNE does
not invest in LS, it means that lSB = 0; the only contract that the MNE o¤ers
is ft; lg :
Some concluding remarks. As aforementioned, we have assumed weak en-
forcement institutions in the South. We use the hypothesis of an external shock
as a form of veriability of the outcome. This is used in order to take into
account the lack of a court of justice able to enforce the contract and punish
the principal or the agent if they do not comply with.
Moreover, we have shown that the expected prot of the MNE does not
depend on the probability to be monitored (1   ):The expected prot of the
MNE depends on the probability to face an high or low type.
We have assumed the existence of a rival "ethical rm", e.g. NGO that
produces also "social goods" for the market of the North. We have assumed
that this NGO has expertice capacities to monitor Southern subcontractors.
Moreover, we have assumed that he NGO monitors subcontractors in order to
damage the reputation of the MNE and reduce its market share.
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Proposition 3 With a strictly positive outside opportunity of the subcontractor,
the MNE will not invest in LS above the minimum standards. For p small
enough, shutdown occurs even if the Inada condition v0(0) = +1 is satised.
The presence of the rival NGO, the lack of public rule on LS in the South,
increase the risk of investing in the project. The transfer that MNE has to pay
is too high. The MNE will invest above the minimum standards i¤ p=1 and
the outside opportunity equals zero. This implies that a prot maximizing rm
will invest in the project if and only if it has an exclusive contract with the
subcontractor.
The main results of this rst part derive from the assumption that the outside
opportunity of the subcontractor does not depend on the probability to be
discovered cheating. In the next section, we will analyse the same problem by
relaxing this assumption.
Observable Outside opportunity conditional on external shock. Let
us relax the assumption of a strictly positive outside opportunity of the sub-
contractor. We assume now that the reservation utility of the subcontractor
depends negatively on the probability to be discovered by the NGO (i.e. prob-
ability that the external shock arrive). The basic assumption is still that the
subcontractor works for di¤erent MNEs at the same time. In the previous case,
we have assumed that the outside opportunity of the subcontractor is a positive
constant. Now we consider the case where other MNEs might dismiss the sub-
contractor if he is discovered cheating (i.e.violating LS). This may reduce the
value of the reservation utility of the subcontractor. Therefore, this may reduce
its opportunity cost to comply with the contract.43
How does it a¤ect the decision of the MNE to invest in ethical project? The
MNE might share the cost of the risk of the project.
The reservation level of utility, denoted U , is dened by:
U = (1  p) t^  ^ c(l^) (34)
where 1  p is the probability that other MNEs dismiss the subcontractor;44
t^ is an average value of transfers paied to the subcontractors and l^ is an average
value of LS within the factory. The subcontractor will be indi¤erent between
comply or not comply with LS if
43Since an investment in "ethical project" requires an initial asset, we consider in this second
part a large rm. Therefore, we can assume that a large rm might know the average value
of the outside opportunity of the subcontractor by making a survey on rival rms behaviour.
44Note this is equal to the probability that the subcontractor is of bad type.
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t  t^ = t^  t
This gives the threshold condition of t :
t^ =
t  t
2
(35)
We assume that MNE observe t^ by auditing.
We may consider the reservation utility has the incentive to lie for the sub-
contractor. This incentive is positives if others MNEs pays him even if it does
not comply, i.e. p = 0:While the incentive to lie is negative if other MNEs do
not pay him if he lies, i.e. p = 1:
The optimal contract of the MNE must solve the following program (P):
max
f(t;l);(t;l)g
p

v(l)  t  (1  p) [v(l)  t] (36)
s.t.
t  c(l)  (1  p) t^  ^ c(l^) (37)
t   c(l)  t   c(l)
By solving the program (P), we obtain the second best level of
 
t; l

and
(t; l) : It is indexed by a superscript ES that means outside opportunity condi-
tional on external shock.
pv0(lES) =  c0(lES) (38)
tES =  c(lES) + (1  p) t^  ^ c(l^) (39)
(1  p)v0(lES) = ^ c0(l^) (40)
tES =  c(lES) +  c(lES) + (1  p) t^  ^ c(l^) (41)
Proposition 4 When the outside opportunity of the subcontractor depends on
the probability to be discovered cheating, the incentive of MNE to invest in "eth-
ical project" are lower than those with a strictly positive outside opportunity.
The MNE has an incentive to deviate if other MNEs invest in higher LS. There
is a free riding e¤ect.
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In the previous section, we have assumed that the reservation utility of the
subcontractor is a constant. It does not change with the probability that the
subcontractor is discovered cheating. But now we assume that the transfer
received by other "general contractors" is a¤ected by the probability that the
subcontractor is of bad type, i.e. (1   p): Then, the principal has to take into
account also the decision of other MNEs, in order to decide the optimal level of
investment.
In this case where the risk is high and the cost is sharing by n MNEs, the
MNE1 has an incentive to free ride. Others pay the "price" to reduce the risk
to be a¤ected by negative publicity. Therefore, this reduces the incentive of the
MNE1to invest in higher LS.45
An other important result is that if MNEs cooperate, this may reduce the
outside opportunity of the subcontractor to U = 0. Indeed, this is why "fair
trade" or "organic farming" market works. The cooperation may reduce the
cost of information rent and increase the "credibility" of the rms investment
in ethical project.
4 Conclusion
In the present paper we used an incentive based-approach to assess the e¢ ciency
of trade policy instruments and private schemes for the promotion of interna-
tional labour standards in Developing Countries. We assumed all along the
paper that a rm, that operates in the South, may choose three levels of labour
standards: operate under the minimum standard (Core Labour Standards-CLS),
comply with CLS or overcomply with CLS. For overcomplying with CLS, we
meant comply with safety conditions, living wage, minimum hours of work.
Indeed, even if almost all developing countries signed ILO Fundamental Con-
ventions, it is possible for a rm to operate under CLS. This is due to the
ine¢ cient enforcement mechanism within the country. Therefore, the choise of
the rm will depend on the cost and benet derived by its own decision.
The basic idea is that it exists a political demand from people in indus-
trialised countries for higher LS in developing countries. A Southern rm can
produce these kinds of "social good" in order to satisfy this demand. Since pro-
ducing social goodimplies higher cost of production, a rm has an incentive
to produce them if and only if benets are higher than costs. Since we are in
the case of asymmetric information (i.e. consumer does not know the quality of
the good), benets are higher than costs if and only if the rm can signal the
true quality to the consumer (positive publicity) or if it exists the probability
to be monitored and discovered (negative publicity).
First, we analysed the role of trade policy instruments, such as preferential
import tari¤s, for the promotion of Core Labour Standards. We examined the
contract where the North gives a transfer to the Southern rm in return for
45 It is easy to show that even in the case of a random outside opportunity of the subcon-
tractor (i.e. not observable by the MNE) the MNE does not change its investment decision.
23
labour standards raise.We studied the moral hazard question raised by the fact
that rms in the South control LS, through its own e¤ort. We characterized
the optimal contract between the North and the South. We showed that trade
policy instruments may implement minimum standards, by paying an additional
cost in order to solve the observability problem. Indeed, a "credible monitoring
mechanism" requires an initial investment, a credible institutions who support
it and a penalty to the rm if detected.
Then, we investigated the role of private schemes for the promotion of "social
standards". We focused on the case where a wealthier rm of the North, i.e. a
MNE, want to invest in "ethical project" in order to di¤erentiate its products.
We examined the contract where the MNE gives a transfer to the Southern rm,
its subcontractor, in return for labour standards raise. The basic idea is that a
subcontractor can work for more than one MNE at the same time. Therefore,
a subcontractor does not have any direct benet from "reputation e¤ect" of
the MNE, achieved by signaling the "quality" of the good (e.g. "green goods",
"ethical goods"). We assumed the existence of an "Ethical Firm", that monitors
the subcontractor of MNEs in order to increase its market share by damaging to
the "reputation" of the MNE. We formalized the action of this "ethical rm", as
an external shock that can reduce the prots of the MNE. This external shock
is the probability that the subcontractor is discovered cheating. In this case,
MNE can be damaged by a negative publicity. We found that with a strictly
positive outside opportunity for the Subcontractor, the MNE will never invest
over the minimum standards. The probability that the subcontractor deviates
is high due to asymmetric information between the MNE and the subcontractor
and weak enforcement institutions in the South.
We considered also the case where the transfer given by other "general con-
tractors" is a¤ected by the probability that the subcontractor is discovered
cheating. We assumed that rival MNEs terminate the contrat with the Sub-
contractor if it is discovered lieing. Therefore, the principal has to take into
account also the decision of rival MNEs, in order to choose the optimal level of
investment. We found that the MNE has an incentive to deviate if rival MNEs
invest in higher LS. There is an incentive to free ride. It means that others pay
the "price" to reduce the risk to be a¤ected by negative publicity. Therefore,
this reduces the incentive of the MNE to invest in higher LS.
Indeed, we found that private schemes may overcome minimum standards
if and only if there is an exclusive contract between the MNE and the Subcon-
tractor, due to this free-riding e¤ect.
Our results put some questions on the e¢ ciency of private schemes, such
as Corporate Social Responsability, for the promotion of LS within a Southern
irm. We focused on the case where a MNE subcontracts with rms operating
in low standards countries. This type of rm organization impose higher cost of
asymmetric information between the upward and downward supplier. This may
explain the failure of some private initiatives to improve working conditions
within Southern rms, like the Code of Conduct, labeling good. The main
limit of such a private schemes is the fact that the subcontractor is not directly
a¤ected by the "reputation" of the MNE and work for di¤erent Brands at the
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same time. Therefore the subcontractor has always an incentive to deviate as
long as it has a strictly positive outside option. Indeed, without an e¤cient
system of national law, a prot maximising rm will always have incentives
to sacrize working conditions of its employees in order to minimize cost of
production.
The interaction between international trade and labour standards remains
an important issue. Economic analysis undertaken in the 1990s was fairly opti-
mistic on the impact of trade on labor. However empirical evidences show how
trade policy may a¤ect negatively the labor market. Therefore, more empirical
research need in order to better understand which is the impact of international
trade on working conditions in developing countries. An other important line of
research is the role of MNEs in raising LS in Southern rms in order to have la-
bor practices more humane and more e¢ cient. Our therotical analysis predicts
no signicant impact of MNE above the minimum standards within subcon-
tractors. Indeed, the ownership and the nature of the rm may have di¤erent
impact on working conditions of the employees.46
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